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just a few obstacles ahead in his quest for dominance -and these obstacles were in Iran.
STATECRAFT AND THE CALCULATIONS FOR WAR
National security strategy has three essential parts: (1) the national interest, (2) the perceived threats to that interest, and (3) the plan for coordinated use of state power to defend and advance the national interest. First, identify the interest, then determine the nature of the threat and only then build a relevant strategic plan. At that point, judge the balance between intentions and capabilities, risks and costs, and means and ends. Iran's revolution expand into Bahrain, whose high percentage of Shi'as made it another target ripe for revolution. From Bahrain the Iranians would be in position to threaten Iraqi shipping. 13 Iraq had to attack in that limited window of opportunity while they had the favorable balance of power.
For Saddam, war was the only means available to secure his objective of eliminating the Iranian threat. However, the now-pending war with Iran also opened up opportunities for
Saddam. There is some divergence of opinion as to whether Saddam's ambition was to be leader of the pan-Arab movement or to focus on the Gulf state region. 14 18 ) These fundamentally different motives and reference points would make it very difficult to contain or conclude the conflict.
THE COURSE OF THE WAR
It is unlikely that Saddam had any idea that war against his neighbor would last eight years, bring two million casualties, and create over two million refugees-at a cost of over two billion dollars to Iran and Iraq. The war jeopardized over fifty percent of the world's proven oil reserves. How did a conflict that at first appeared to be so limited soon threaten to disrupt the entire industrialized world? If Saddam's overarching political objective-keeping power with a greatly diminished internal and external threat-was reasonable, the dismal results of the war prove that there was a fatal flaw in the link between political objectives and military strategy. Iraq had advantages in several other areas related to dynamic balance of force indicators.
Iran's relative global isolation after the revolution contrasted with Iraq's friendly relations with all its neighbors. Iraq had relatively effective national logistics, combat, and combat service support systems, whereas Iran's logistics system-its combat lifeline-was weak. Iraqi military morale was higher than Iran's and was expected to rise exponentially with a quick victory over
Tehran. Iraq had large financial reserves and excellent credit and financial backing from the Gulf states; Iran also had large cash reserves and continued to receive substantial oil revenues.
One of Iran's major vulnerabilities was that its oil reserves in Khuzistan were uncomfortably close to the Iraqi border. Iraq's vulnerabilities included lack of strategic depth, tension between the Sunni leadership and Shi'a troops, and fear of both northern and southern rebellion. 
